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I. INTRODUCTION
Nearly all interesting legal issues require accurate predictions
about human behavior to be resolved satisfactorily. Judges, policy-
makers, and academics invoke mental models of individual and social
behavior whenever they estimate the desirability of alternative rules,
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policies, or procedures. Contemporary legal scholarship has come to
recognize that if these predictions are naive and intuitive, without
any strong empirical grounding, they are susceptible to error and
ideological bias. Something more rigorous is thus expected when
normative claims are advanced, and the place of the social sciences
has expanded in legal discourse to satisfy this expectation.'
Three branches of the social sciences-economics, psychology,
and sociology-offer the most obvious assistance in predicting every-
day human behavior, and each has a well-recognized history of influ-
ence on legal scholarship. The legal realists-most notably, Jerome
Frank2-- took psychology quite seriously half a century ago;
"sociological jurisprudence" came to prominence shortly thereafter,
and law and society studies are still highly visible. But as many have
said so often, both psychology and sociology have suffered from the
inability to generate a unified behavioral model rivaling the
simplicity, elegance, and testability of the economist's utility-
maximizing rational actor. For this reason (and probably a host of
others3 ), the rational actor model came to dominate predictions about
how "normal" persons and groups respond to legal incentives. By the
late 1970s and early 1980s, law and economics was the one social
science-based approach to have a truly pervasive effect on legal
thinking. "Law and psychology" for some time was largely the study
of either marginal segments of the population, such as the criminally
insane, or specialized procedural subjects like jury behavior and
eyewitness recall. 4
* Lee S. & Charles A. Speir Professor, Vanderbilt Law School. Special thanks are due to
Jeff Rachlinski and Russell Korobkin for their comments and suggestions.
1. This is hardly a novel insight. Ed Rubin's work has been the most thorough explora-
tion of the influences on "elite" legal thinking. See Edward L. Rubin, Law And and the
Methodology of Law, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 521; Edward L. Rubin, The New Legal Process, the
Synthesis of Discourse, and the Microanalysis of Institutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1393 (1996). It
is also not to say that scholars are necessarily comfortable with heavy reliance on social science
research in legal analysis. See generally David L. Faigman, To Have and Have Not: Assessing
the Value of Social Science to the Law as Science and Policy, 38 EMORY L.J. 1005 (1989); Paul E.
Meehl, Law and the Fireside Inductions (with Postscript): Some Reflections of a Clinical
Psychologist, 7 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 521 (1989). Rather, some behavioral assumptions are crucial to
legal reasoning and lawyers are not by virtue of their training necessarily expert in making or
testing behavioral predictions. Thus the notion has arisen, with its heavy influence on modem
legal scholarship, that it "takes a theory to beat a theory," i.e., that to win a normative debate
there must be affirmative empirical justification for any set of behavioral claims. See, e.g., Fred
S. McChesney, Assumptions, Empirical Evidence and Social Science Method, 96 YALE L.J. 339,
340 (1986) (making this argument).
2. See Franks classic, JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930).
3. See infra note 65.
4. The tension between economics and sociology, to which we shall return later, is nicely
portrayed from a variety of viewpoints in Symposium, Law and Society & Law and Economics:
Common Ground, Irreconcilable Differences, New Directions, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 375.
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At roughly the same time that economics was rapidly diffusing
into law,5 work by cognitive and social psychologists challenging the
orthodox presumption of rational human behavior was becoming more
prominent in the social sciences. To be sure, psychology has long
claimed that human behavior is complex and contingent, and theories
like cognitive dissonance (not to mention a broad range of
psychoanalytic constructs) have for some time been available to ques-
tion the decision making of otherwise normal members of society.6
But the mid to late 1970s and early 1980s brought distinct focus and
attention to the new subdiscipline of "behavioral decision theory"
within cognitive and social psychology. Work by researchers such as
Amos Tversky, Daniel Kahneman, Hillel Einhorn, Robin Hogarth,
Arie Kruglanski, Lee Ross, Richard Thaler, and many others
suggested that there are heuristics, biases, and other departures from
rational decision-making processes that are systematic and
predictable and can thus be modeled and tested with a fair degree of
rigor.7 The challenge to orthodox economic theory was plain, and a
5. The privileged status of economic analysis has not set well with many legal academics,
of course. The debate about law and economics-particularly concern about the artificiality of
some of the economists' standard assumptions about human behavior-has been very visible in
the legal literature and hardly needs to be repeated here. Critiques have ranged from the work
of the critical legal scholars pointing to the political and ideological assumptions and implica-
tions of heavy reliance on economic analysis, to the work of far more traditionalist schol-
ars-most recently given expression in Anthony Kronman's THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS
OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION (1993)--concerned about the dissonance between economic theory in
legal discourse and the ideals of realism and pragmatic wisdom. The point that if no social
science-based behavioral theory accurately captures reality, then the heavy use of the social
sciences in legal analysis will have a distorting impact on both lawyering and the legal process,
see supra note 1, is well taken.
6. Cognitive dissonance is a basic concept in social psychology, referring to the tendency
of people unconsciously to adjust their attitudes and beliefs to conform to voluntary choices
previously made. See generally ELLIOTARONSON, THE SOCIAL ANIAL (7th ed. 1995). For a rare
but noteworthy use of cognitive dissonance in the economics literature, see George A. Akerlof &
William T. Dickens, The Economic Consequences of Cognitive Dissonance, 72 Am. ECON. REV.
307(1982).
7. This work quickly became voluminous, appearing both in standard psychology jour-
nals and specialized journals on judgment and decison making, most notably the specialized
journal Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes. Some of the classic books in
this area are ROBYN M. DAWES, RATIONAL CHOICE IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD (1988); DECISION
MAKING: DESCRPTiVE, NORmATIVE AND PRESCRITVE INTERACTIONS (David E. Bell et al. eds.,
1988); INSIGHTS IN DECISION MAKING: A TRIBUTE TO HILLEL J. EINORN (Robin M. Hogarth ed.,
1990); JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY READER (Hal R. Arkes &
Kenneth R. Hammond eds., 1986); JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES
(Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982); RICHARD NISBETT & LEE ROSS, HUMAN INFERENCE:
STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT (1980). For some good recent reviews of
the literature, see SCOTT PLOUS, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDGMENT AND DECISIONMAKING (1993);
Colin F. Camerer, Individual Decision Making, in HANDBOOK OF EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS 587
(John H. Kagel & Alvin E. Roth eds., 1995); Matthew Rabin, Psychology and Economics, 36 J.
ECON. LITERATURE 11 (1998).
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debate between the disciplines quickly began.8 This debate is still far
from resolved.9 Conventional economics remains an extraordinarily
powerful discipline, but within economics there is an increasing
willingness (sometimes grudging, sometimes not) to take the psy-
chologists' empirical claims seriously-even in market settings.
Transaction cost economics accepts that the rationality of economic
actors is "bounded," to use Herbert Simon's phraseology, and bounded
rationality can include cognitive imperfection as well as informational
limits. 10 "Behavioral economics" has become an accepted subdiscipline
within economics, and papers in the best economics and finance
journals are more and more apt to make unsarcastic reference to the
psychological literature. A pointed illustration of this interdiscipli-
nary accomodation is the venerable Quarterly Journal of Economics'
dedication of its May 1997 issue to the work of the late Amos Tversky,
who pioneered behavioral decision theory."
Many legal academics have become aware of this behavioral
research only in the last few years, and there is a sense of newness to
these materials (not to mention the sense that it stands in stark con-
trast to "economic analysis"). Other professional
disciplines-management and accounting in particular-grasped the
implications of behavioral decision theory far sooner and more
thoroughly than has law.12 Yet it is easy to underestimate the impact
this work has already had on legal thinking in a range of subject
areas. My purpose in this literature review, then, is to provide a
retrospective on the diffusion of this research into legal scholarship
over the past two decades and then to pose some questions for future
work in this area. As an Appendix, I have included a bibliography of
existing legal scholarship, through early 1998, that has utilized this
behavioral research. 3
8. The debate appeared most visibly in a conference published in the Journal of Business
in 1986, entitled The Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory. See 59 J. BUS. S181 (1986).
9. For more recent expressions, see THE RATIONAL FOUNDATIONs OF ECONOMIC
BEHAVIOR: PROCEEDINGS OF THE IEA (Kenneth J. Arrow et al. eds., 1996). See also Lola Lopes,
Psychology and Economics: Perspectives on Risk, Cooperation and the Marketplace, 1994 ANN.
REV. PSYCHOL. 197; Jason F. Shogren & Dermot J. Hayes, Resolving Differences in Willingness
to Pay and Willingness to Accept: Reply, 87 AM. ECON. REV. 241 (1997).
10. An excellent survey here is John Conlisk, Why Bounded Rationality?, 34 J. ECON.
LITERATURE 669 (1996). The prominence of transaction cost economics in legal scholarship is
discussed in, among others, the work of Rubin, supra note 1.
11. See 112 Q.J. ECON. 341 (1997).
12. For an interesting introduction to the relevance of the behavioral research to mana-
gerial decision making, see MAX H. BAzERmAN, JUDGME IN MANAGERIAL DECISION MAKING
(4th ed. 1998).
13. For ease of reference, I will hereafter cite all works of legal scholarship that appear in
the bibliography simply by the author and date of publication, which is the standard social
1502 [Vol. 51:1499
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H. DEFINITIONAL BOUNDARIES
There is no clean line of demarcation between the particular
work on judgment and decision making that has captured the atten-
tion of legal scholars and work in cognitive or social psychology gener-
ally, which has long had an influence on the law. If we were to pose
the question by asking what psychological factors influence individual
judgments and choices, we would have to consider a full range of
possibilities-beliefs, attitudes, emotions, and social forces, along with
purely cognitive processes. This literature review would quickly
become coextensive with law and psychology generally-an
unmanageable task, even if we put aside the large portion of this
literature that is devoted to deviant or abnormal populations.
To impose manageability, I will be fairly subjective. My focus
will be on uses by legal scholars of the "new" cognitive psychology
literature on decision-making biases-i.e., tendencies to make judg-
ments or decisions in ways that systematically depart from the
economist's rational choice/expected utility model. Without any at-
tempt to describe them fully,'14 the following groupings seem to have
been of most interest to lawyers:
(1) Status Quo/Loss Aversion Biases and Framing Effects.
Much of the work in this area examines the tendency of people to
weigh losses more heavily than gains, and thus to be more willing to
assume risk when facing the loss of something they have than when
potentially gaining something they don't have. This tendency
produces a natural bias toward the status quo. Kabneman and
Tversky have developed their "prospect theory" of behavior based on
this asymmetry in evaluating losses and gains.15 There is also a large
body of work that suggests that whether decisions are "framed" in
terms of potential gains or losses affects decisions even though the
framing may be completely arbitrary and manipulable. A
science (as opposed to legal) citation method. Following this, reference to my own work will be
in the third-person form. All other citations will be in standard legal form.
14. Readers interested in learning more about these biases should consult materials of the
sort cited supra note 7, or overviews from a legal perspective such as Edwards & von
Winterfeldt (1986), Ulen (1989), Arkes (1989) or Sunstein (1997). There appear to be two main
(and somewhat distinct) sources in the psychology literature from which to draw. The first,
associated with Kahneman, Tversky, and their colleagues, is purely cognitive, and derives from
the long-standing (often highly mathematical) research program on decision theory. The other
has its roots more firmly in social psychology, and goes under the heading social cognition. On
the latter, see generally SusAN T. FiSmi & SHELLEY E. TAYLOR, SOcIAL COGNITION (2d ed. 1991).
Today, many researchers in this subject area borrow freely from both traditions.
15. For a good description and use of this theory from a legal perspective,'see Noll & Krier
(1990).
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commonplace manifestation of the status quo bias is the tendency for
people to demand more to sell something they own than they would
pay to buy the same item, referred to as the "endowment effect." This
bias, coupled with biases in perceptions of equity and fairness
(discussed below), is the basis for the most distinctive legal
contribution of the behavioral literature: the possibility that the
Coase theorem, which has had such an immense impact on law and
economics, fails in real life because disparate valuations interfere
with the ability of parties to reach optimal private agreements.
(2) Anchoring and Adjustment. Another set of findings
from this literature is that people "anchor" on some initial possibility
in the decision-making process, usually the status quo, and fail to
adjust carefully as new information becomes available. In addition,
an adjustment that does occur may be overly affected by the salience
or recency of the data.
(3) Illusory Correlations and Causation Biases. People
often find causal patterns and relationships in matters that are the
product of random chance. Statistical base rates are ignored in favor
of highly salient or available, but less predictive, information. We
should also take note here of a construct from social psychology: the
fundamental attribution bias, whereby people tend to overestimate
the influence of dispositional factors in explaining another person's
behavior, at the expense of situational influences.
(4) Biases in Risk Perception. All three of the foregoing
groups of biases can affect how people perceive and evaluate risk.16 In
addition, people tend to ignore low probability risks that are not
otherwise made salient, and to have a strong preference for the
elimination of uncertainty (e.g., to value risk reduction from five
percent to zero percent significantly more than a reduction from ten
percent to five percent).
(5) The Hindsight Bias. People overestimate the extent to
which they could have predicted some future event (i.e., its
foreseeability) once they learn what actually happened.
(6) Context Biases. Just as loss and gain framing may have
a distorting impact on choice, the relative preference as between two
16. Risk regulation has been a major subject of interest to social scientists, particularly in
the work of Paul Slovic and his colleagues. See, e.g., Paul Slovic et al., Regulation of Risk: A
Psychological Perspective, in REGULATORY POLICY AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 241 (Roger G. Noll
ed., 1985). There is also an interesting body of behavioral research on insurance choices that
should interest legal scholars. See, e.g., Robin M. Hogarth & Howard Kunreuther, Risk,
Ambiguity, and Insurance, 2 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 5 (1989); Howard Kunreuther et al.,
Insurer Ambiguity and Market Failure, 7 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 71 (1993).
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options may be unduly affected by the availability of alternatives,
particularly if they involve compromise possibilities.
(7) Intertemporal Biases. Future risks and rewards are
discounted more heavily than standard economic analysis would
indicate, suggesting a bias toward consumption and against deferred
gratification.
(8) Egocentric Biases. A wide variety of biases fall under
the label "egocentric." For instance, people have a tendency to engage
in self-serving construals, explaining successes by reference to effi-
ciency or control, and failures by reference to luck or other external
circumstances. Individuals overestimate the extent to which other
people share their same attitudes and beliefs (the false consensus
effect). In assessing what is "fair," assessments of fairness are biased
toward one's own self-interest. This latter finding is troubling both
for purposes of ethical analysis 7 and because research suggests that
perceptions of unfairness can interfere with optimal contracting.'8
Egocentric biases are particularly interesting because of a
debate in the literature as to their derivation. By and large, cognitive
psychologists have been more concerned with documenting the ro-
bustness of these behavioral tendencies than with explaining why
they exist. It is assumed that some of these "heuristics" persist
simply because of limited cognitive processing capacity and sources of
information. Some egocentric cognitions may be readily explained in
this fashion. 9 Since a person receives so much more (and different)
information about himself than about others, there will be natural bi-
ases in the assessment of one's self compared to the assessment of
others. But there is a large body of work that suggests many of these
kinds of biases are "motivated" ones.20  For example, many
researchers claim that people are motivated to maintain or enhance
their own self-image (self-esteem), and will unconsciously bias the
17. For a particularly interesting recent study along these lines, see C. Daniel Batson et
al., In a Very Different Voice: Unmasking Moral Hypocrisy, 72 J. PERSoNALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
1335 (1997).
18. The barriers to optimal contracting are explored generally as an empirical matter in
Hoffman & Spitzer (1985). For a discussion of the fairness problem from a legal perspective, see
Loewenstein et al. (1993).
19. See NISBErr & Ross, supra note 7, at 228-34 (describing research on "hot" versus
"cold" cognitions).
20. See generally Ziva Kunda, The Case for Motivated Reasoning, 108 PSYCHOL. BULL. 480
(1990). Many kinds of biases can be explained in both cognitive and motivational ways. For
instance, there is the sunk cost effect, the tendency of people to persist too long in a course of
action once undertaken. This effect can be explained as a product of informational limitations,
see Issacharoff & Lowenstein (1990; 1995), or as a self-esteem maintenance device, see id. and
Langevoort (1995).
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construal of information to accomplish this. Here, the new behavioral
work makes a distinct connection with the more traditional
psychological construct of cognitive dissonance-that is, the tendency
for people to adjust their attitudes and beliefs (and construe new
information) in a way that justifies choices and commitments
previously made. Other possibly motivated biases along these lines
are the tendency toward excessive optimism and an illusion of control
over the future, which may be seen as mechanisms to relieve -stress
and anxiety and produce more aggressive, persistent behavior
(thereby leading to greater success).21
Having put forth this list of systematic biases, I want to be
careful about the semantics of rationality. The kinds of biases de-
tected in the behavioral research plainly depart from the Baysean
forms of subjective expected utility-maximizing behavior that are the
core of the economists' working model. But as social philosopher Jon
Elster has repeatedly pointed out 22 (and both Jules Coleman (1997)
and Robert Scott (1986) have echoed for the benefit of legal audi-
ences), identifying a departure from rationality is not the same as
discovering irrationality. Among other things, in a world of bounded
rationality--coupled with the inability of people to always control
their will successfully-what seems to be a heuristic or a bias might
really be quite adaptive for most people most of the time. Indeed,
some biases create self-fulfiling prophecies by prompting others to
behave in a more favorable fashion. In this sense, using the term
irrationality may convey an unnecessarily pejorative connotation.
III. THE USE OF THE NEw BEHAVIORAL DECISION-MAKING RESEARCH
BY LEGAL SCHOLARS
Until the mid-1980s, use of the new behavioral research on
judgment and decision making by legal scholars was limited and epi-
sodic. Kelman (1979) drew on the Kahneman-Tversky research in his
challenges to the usefulness of the Coase theorem in economic
analysis of law. This initiated the line of work in which the bias
literature has been invoked to criticize the strong normative and
descriptive claims of the law and economics movement. At about the
same time, proceduralists recognized the usefulness of this literature
21. See, e.g., ARONSON, supra note 6, at 168-71.
22. See JON ELsTER, SOUR GRAPES: STUDIES IN THE SUBVERSION OF RATIONALITY (1983)
[hereinafter SOUR GRAPES]; JON ELSTER, ULYSSES AND THE SIRENS: STUDIES IN RATIONAIrY
AND IRRATIONALTY (1979) [hereinafter ULYSSES AND THE SIRENS].
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in assessing the process of judge and jury decision making, a subject
area that has long incorporated psychology research as a primary
reference tool. An article by Saks and Kidd (1980) was a seminal step
in what has become a progressive research program by both
psychologists and lawyers to develop heuristic-based models of
decision making in trial settings. Other significant early uses of the
cognitive materials by legal scholars were articles by Latin (1982;
1985) on tort and environmental law; Farber (1983) on contract law;
Coffee (1981), Haft (1982), and Cox and Munsinger (1985) on
managerial decision making in corporate law; Eskridge (1984) on
consumer protection in the home purchase decision; and Jackson's
(1985) use of the materials in articulating his approach to the fresh
start policy in bankruptcy law. Sunstein (1986) also gave this
research some prominence in his discussion of governmental
interference with private choices generally.2
The field received a boost in visibility in 1986 with the publica-
tion of a symposium in the Southern California Law Review entitled
Legal Implications of Human Error. The lead article by two social
scientists, Edwards and von Winterfeldt, contained the first compre-
hensive survey for lawyers of the heuristics and biases literature and
suggestions on how they might affect a broad range of legal issues,
well beyond the conventional "law and psychology" issues. Much of
the symposium, however, was more skeptical of the usefulness of this
research as a challenge to the law and economics paradigm-little
surprise given that so many of the contributors (Roberta Romano,
Robert Scott, Alan Schwartz) were leaders in the law and economics
movement.M
Over the remainder of the decade, there was steadily increas-
ing interest in the behavioral research. Both Ulen (1989) and Arkes
(1989) provided general surveys of the cognitive imperfection litera-
ture and observations about its legal significance. Ellickson (1989)
did so as well in what was a loud and widely heard call for greater
emphasis on both psychological and sociological research as a coun-
terweight to the dominance of orthodox law and economics. At the
same time, more and more scholars were invoking behavioral decision
theory within individual disciplines, discussed below. The June 1990
23. Schwartz & Wilde (1983) did as well, albeit in the form of an attack on the research's
significance in market settings.
24. Scott's article is particularly interesting and by no means entirely dismissive of the
cognitive research. His point, which anticipates the growing acceptance of psychological re-
search within economics, is that rationality is hard to define-what seems to be irrational may
in fact be an adaptive form of behavior, thus explaining its persistence.
1998] 1507
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symposium issue of the Journal of Legal Studies on the Law and
Economics of Risk was a particular focal point of interest because it
contained articles by scholars previously noted for their law and
economics analysis advocating the relevance of the behavioral
research for both contract law gap filling (Gillette (1990)) and the
relevance of prospect theory to the formulation of public policy
regarding environmental risks (Noll and Krier (1990), with
interesting commentaries on the use of behavioral decision theory in
law by both Spitzer (1990) and Camerer (1990)).
Through the 1990s, legal usage of the behavioral research be-
came substantially more pervasive. Recent conceptual overviews by
Sunstein (1997) and Jolls et al. (1998)-the latter, in turn, provoking
rebuttals by both Kelman (1998) and Posner (1998)-have now given
the subject particular salience.25 Rather than continue with a general
evolutionary description of the legal literature through the 1990s,
however, it may be more worthwhile to move discipline-by-discipline
to survey the impact the research has had over the last twenty
years. 6
A. Judicial Decision Making, Trial Procedure, and Evidence
As noted earlier, one of the first and most obvious uses of the
research on behavioral decision making was in analyzing how judges
and juries decide cases. Here, social psychology already had a perva-
sive influence, with many psychologists devoting their primary re-
search attention to the subject. Hence, the rapid and broad diffusion
of these materials in legal studies was natural. A fair portion of arti-
cles published in specialized journals like Law and Human Behavior
relate social or cognitive psychology to questions of jury fact-finding
and evidence standards. Hence, this survey of the topic will be par-
ticularly selective in identifying those articles that make clear use of
the contemporary heuristics and bias research. Even then, it will only
be a small sampling.27
Saks and Kidd (1980) tied the early decision-making research
to this question, surveying all the heuristics and biases for their rele-
25. American Association of Law Schools annual meeting programs in 1997 and 1998 have
featured these materials, and both Stanford University (largely through the efforts of Paul
Brest) and the University of Illinois (Tom Ulen and Russell Korobkin) have introduced law
school courses in which they are studied.
26. In addition to that of Sunstein (1997), a useful post-1990 general discussion of the
behavioral literature from a legal perspective is Ulen's review-essay (1994) of Richard Thaler's
books THE WNER'S CURSE (1992) and QUASI-RATIONAL ECONOMICS (1992).
27. A good anthology of writings on this subject is one edited by Hastie (1993).
1508 [Vol. 51:1499
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vance to trial deliberations. A similar theme is found in a book review
by Spitzer (1981). In his contribution to the Southern California Law
Review symposium, Gold (1986) considered how judges should react to
the potential for these kinds of bias. Through the 1980s, social
psychologists Nancy Pennington and Reid Hastie developed their
"story model" of jury behavior, which uses the social judgment
literature to build an account for how juries react to the presentation
of evidence and its impact on their decision making. Their presenta-
tion of the story model to a legal audience, followed by an interesting
commentary by Rick Lempert, can be found in a symposium on deci-
sion and inference in litigation in the Cardozo Law Review (1991). In
turn, concern about decision-making bias has been connected to the
formulation of appropriate rules and standards of civil and criminal
procedure. Of note here is Clermont's (1987) use of the psychological
literature to argue for "simplified" liability standards and burdens of
proof given natural limitations on juries' ability to process informa-
tion. Recently, on the other hand, Saks (1997) has cautioned against
too ready a conclusion that jury bias is problematic simply from ex-
perimental studies.
Evidence scholarship has also been heavily influenced by the
behavioral work, especially with regard to questions about probabilis-
tic (base rate) reasoning compared to other forms of inference. An
early symposium on probabilistic evidence in the Boston University
Law Review (1986) contains a number of references to the heuristics
and biases work. Koehler and Shaviro (1990) have expanded on this
issue, and references can also be found in a number of the articles in
the Cardozo symposium noted above.
More specific aspects of jury fact-finding have also profited
from heuristics and bias research. For example, Perlin (1990) consid-
ered the potential for heuristic reasoning by juries to distort applica-
tions of the insanity defense. An empirical study by McCaffery et al.
(1995) considers how gain/loss framing and related matters might
affect jury deliberations over pain and suffering awards. Kelman et
al. (1996) have offered an experimental examination of context
dependence: whether the presence or placement of alternatives (e.g.,
the availability of lesser counts or compromise verdicts) could
influence the relative preferences for the original options. Feigenson
and his colleagues (1997) have studied victim-blaming in comparative
negligence cases. In an article that draws heavily on social cognition
research, Armour (1995) examines racial stereotyping in judicial
decision making and its potential to perpetuate discrimination.
1998] 1509
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A particular concern expressed in the early work on jury delib-
erations was the fear that juries might be inclined to find liability too
easily because of the hindsight bias (the tendency to consider events
more foreseeable once told of the outcome). Noteworthy articles have
offered both empirical and theoretical support for this concern in civil
litigation against police officers for illegal searches (Casper et al.
1989), medical malpractice as contrasted with corporate litigation
under the business judgment rule (Arkes & Schipani 1994), and neg-
ligence law (Kamin & Rachlinski 1995). Rachlinski (1998) has pro-
vided a broad overview of hindsight bias and judicial efforts to re-
strain it. Jolls et al. (1998) have also offered some specific
mechanisms for debiasing.
Although most of the work in the judicial process area focuses
on fact-finding, there has been a small amount of attention paid to
what the bias literature says about how judges decide matters of law.
Notable here is the work by Laufer and Walt (1992) on the psychology
of adherence to precedent.
B. Litigation Decisions, Settlement, and Negotiation
Deciding whether to bring, settle, or terminate lawsuits is
another obvious subject for behavioral inquiry. Using the literature
on gain/loss framing, Rachlinski (1996) has shown empirically how
biased perception prompted by the sense of loss, especially on the part
of defendants, may make settlement harder to reach than standard
economic theory would predict, and the implications this has for cer-
tain kinds of procedural reforms (such as "loser pays"). Along similar
lines are two papers by Korobkin and Guthrie, one dealing with fram-
ing and equity-seeking in settlement negotiations (1994(a)), the other
on the role of anchoring and adjustment and dissonance reduction
with respect to opening offers (1994(b)). Babcock and her colleagues
(1995) also have identified framing effects in studying the role of prior
expectations in settlement evaluation.2 Both Rachlinski (1996) and
(in even more detail) Korobkin and Guthrie (1997) have suggested
that these settlement barriers may be reduced by the presence of
lawyers.
Focusing specifically on egocentric biases, Loewenstein and his
collaborators (1993) have demonstrated how parties may either be
overoptimistic in the assessments of cases or construe the fairness of
28. An earlier study by van Koppen (1990) on the status quo bias produced somewhat
more ambiguous results.
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the situation in a self-serving fashion, both of which would inhibit
them from reaching optimal settlements. The same group (Babcock et
al. (1998)) has also, however, suggested some means for "debiasing"
such perceptions. Work by Issacharoff and Loewenstein has also
shown how procedural mechanisms designed to cause more up-front
information sharing and evaluation, like liberalized summary
judgment standards (1990) and mandatory disclosures in the
discovery process (1995), may not have the desired pro-settlement
effects in light of self-serving inference and the sunk cost
phenomenon. Huang and Wu (1992) have developed a formal
economic model of litigation/settlement behavior that incorporates the
role of emotions, particularly the desire to be treated fairly.
These barriers to litigation settlement can readily be general-
ized to other forms of negotiation and conflict resolution.29 For law-
yers, good behavioral overviews on conflict resolution generally can be
found in Mnookin (1993), Mnookin and Ross (1995), and Kahneman
and Tversky (1995).30 Brown (1997) has specifically studied the role of
hope and optimism in negotiations.
C. Contract Law
If parties to a contract suffer from cognitive limitations that
prevent them from making wise commitments, then there is at least a
prima facie case for more paternalistic forms of judicial intervention
rather than strict reliance on freedom of contract (Sunstein (1986;
1997)). Farber (1983) made early use of the literature in raising
doubts about warranty disclaimers; shortly thereafter, Eskridge
(1984) made a similar claim, arguing that home buyers need greater
protection from sales pressure.31 Jackson (1985) made strong use of
the literature on cognitive limitations in justifying bankruptcy law's
willingness to grant debtors a fresh start. A general overview of the
relationship between the psychology literature and consumer protec-
tion is found in Silber (1990).
29. See, e.g., ROBERT M. BASTRESS & JOSEPH D. HARBAUGH, INTERVIEWING, COUNSELING
AND NEGOTIATION: SKILLS FOR EFFECTIVE REPRESENTATION (1990); MARGARET A. NEALE & MAX
H. BAZERMAN, COGNITION AND RATIONALITY IN NEGOTIATION (1991). We should take note here
of the heavy uses of social and cognitive psychology for purposes of both research and teaching
in clinical legal education generally (especially negotiation and trial practice), a subject area
that would deserve a separate bibliography.
30. The latter two articles are found in a collection of materials designed to integrate eco-
nomic and psychological approaches to the study of conflict resolution. See BARRIERS TO
CONFLICT RESOLUTION (Kenneth J. Arrow et al. eds., 1995).
31. The home-buying issue is also treated in Sovern (1993).
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More fundamentally, both Gillette (1990) and Melvin
Eisenberg (1995) have used behavioral research to suggest that even
fairly sophisticated parties to a contract may not see risks clearly at
the time of contracting. Eisenberg delves into a wider range of
contract law doctrines, from conditions and excuses through the
treatment of liquidated damages clauses, and argues that cognitive
biases justify judicial limits on the bargain principle. 2 Assessing the
costs and benefits of various judicial attitudes toward risk-insensitive
contracting, Gillette is more agnostic, though he doubts that a rule
that penalizes misperceivers is likely to be the most efficient one.
Korobkin (1998) explores a slightly different phenomenon in
his experimental study of the status quo bias. His interest is in con-
tract default rules: the "entitlement" that the law creates, subject to
being contracted around should the parties so desire. He offers evi-
dence that the act of granting such an entitlement shapes preferences,
making actors less willing to give them up in a Coasean bargain.
Specific kinds of contracts and contractual provisions have
been examined from a psychological standpoint. Garvin (1998) has
provided a detailed study of various biases as they relate to the
"adequate assurance of performance" issue when breach is threat-
ened. With respect to pension plan decisions, Weiss (1991) has found
cause to question whether employees will make prudent choices in the
face of predictable intertemporal biases, a problem that has also been
explored by Jolls with respect to both contract modifications and age
discrimination in employment (1996; 1997). Langevoort (1996) has
argued that decisions to purchase securities may be tainted by a vari-
ety of cognitive and motivational biases, many of which prompt a
higher than expected degree of trust in stockbroker recommenda-
tions-a concern that may be generalized to a much wider range of
sales interactions.
D. Tort Law
With its strong state of mind emphasis, tort law is a natural
subject for drawing from the behavioral literature. The concern is
that risk perception by both tortfeasors and victims may be skewed by
predictable biases, resulting in inadequate deterrence and a subopti-
32. There has been a response from more conventional economic analysts, of course-that
market forces and institutional constraints will tend to counter the harm that might otherwise
seem to follow from cognitive biases. See, e.g., Schwartz & Wilde (1983) (regarding standard
form contracts). On the possibility of commercial norms serving as mechanisms for overcoming
individual bias, see Kraus (1997).
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mal liability regime. Latin (1985) was an early explorer of this possi-
bility in an article that provoked an accompanying rebuttal from
Richard Posner (1985). Ulen (1989) considered the deterrence issue in
his general overview of the potential for integrating cognitive
psychology into economic analysis of law; a subsequent paper (1995)
developed these ideas more fully.33
There has been even greater attention to victim decision mak-
ing. One of the legal psychologists in the field, Baruch Fischoff
(1977), authored a very early study of this problem in the products
liability setting. This also became the principal focus of Latin's work
in this area (1985; 1987), culminating in an article devoted to (and
highly critical of) the efficacy of product warnings in light of contem-
porary psychological research (1994). A leading risk researcher now
based at Harvard Law School, Kip Viscusi (1996), has also studied
information processing by potential tort victims, coming to a less pes-
simistic conclusion than Latin but still conceding serious risk percep-
tion problems in consumer choice.3 Some prescriptive suggestions
regarding mandatory disclosure for consumer decisions can be found
in Jolls et al. (1998).
We should also take note of a set of articles doubting that indi-
vidual decision-making flaws are as prevalent or harmful in the tort
setting as the behavioral research might seem to indicate. For in-
stance, Schwartz (1988) has defended the notion of consumer sover-
eignty against behavioral attack in his article on products liability
reform; earlier, Grether et al. (1986) had contributed a paper to the
Southern California Law Review symposium doubting whether con-
cern over consumer "information overload" (and resulting heuristics
in product search) was as serious as suggested elsewhere. With re-
spect to tortfeasor decision making, Heald and Heald (1991) have
expressed doubt as to whether "mindless" behavior is actually likely
to lead to a higher incidence of negligence, given the ability of sche-
mas and scripts to incorporate a broad range of social experience. 35
Croley (1996) has argued that whatever the likelihood that cognitive
33. See also Weiner & Small (1992). The MeCaffery et al. (1995) study of biases in the
award of compensatory damages for pain and suffering in tort cases is also of relevance. In the
context of a broader commentary, Langevoort (1995) has raised the possibility that egocentric
biases in particular (e.g., cognitive dissonance, overoptimism, the illusion of control) may
frustrate tort law's deterrence objective by blinding actors to the risks of their own errors or
misfeasance.
34. Viscusi is the author of a large number of books and articles utilizing behavioral eco-
nomics in the study of risk-taking and risk regulation, especially in the health and safety area.
See, e.g., W. Kip VIScusI, FATAL TRADEOFFS (1993); WESLEY A. MAGAT & W. Kp Viscusi,
INFORMATIONAL APPROACHES TO REGULATION (1992).
35. These ideas are further explored in Heald (1993).
1998] 1513
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
imperfection makes individuals more likely to behave negligently,
organizations are less likely to be prone to such bias. This argument
strengthens the case for vicarious liability in tort law.
Finally, we should recall the studies described above dealing
with the hindsight bias in judicial decision making. Two of these
(Kamin & Rachlinskl (1995); Arkes & Schipani (1994)) are specifically
negligence-oriented, raising questions about whether judges or juries
might be inclined to impose liability too easily once given the benefit
of hindsight, even if warned to avoid the bias. In his more recent
paper, Rachlinski (1998) considers the interplay between the hind-
sight bias and tort policy in terms of both deterrence and fairness.
E. Criminal Law
Like tort law, criminal law is a promising subject for behav-
ioral research connections given its state of mind emphasis. The long-
standing interest of psychologists and sociologists in criminology
assured that the new behavioral research would be quickly and
broadly explored; the growth of economic analysis of criminal behavior
provided an appealing target. 6 Leo Katz (1987) has explored the
relevance of cognitive bias in his otherwise more philosophical mus-
ings on criminal law theory.
One place where the line between behavioral decision theory
and sociology generally tends to blur is in the subject of social influ-
ence. There is, of course, a great deal of work in social psychology on
interpersonal influences on antisocial behavior that has been of inter-
est to both legal scholars and criminologists (e.g., Milgram's studies
on submission to authority 7). Similarly, the role of social norms in
legal compliance has been a long-standing research area in the social
sciences, and is gaining increasing attention in legal studies. Akers
(1990) has lamented the prominence of rational choice theory and the
lack of adequate attention to theories of social psychological forces in
contemporary analysis of criminal behavior. In a broad survey de-
36. In the criminology literature, a good collection of materials on the rationality of crimi-
nal behavior (including a number of papers that take the heuristics and biases research as a
point of departure) is THE REASONING CRIMINAL: RATIONAL CHOICE PERSPECTIVES ON
OFFENDING (Derek B. Cornish & Ronald V. Clarke eds., 1986). Although strong forms of
rational actor analyses of criminal behavior predominate in economics, some economists have
demonstrated an interest in incorporating certain biases into their analyses of criminal behav-
ior. See, e.g., William T. Dickens, Crime and Punishment Again: The Economic Approach With
a Psychological Twist, 30 J. PUB. ECON. 97 (1986).
37. See Stanley Milgram, Behavioral Study of Obedience, 67 J. ABNORMAL & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 371 (1963). See generally HERBERT C. KELMAN & V. LEE HAMILTON, CRIMES OF
OBEDIENCE: TOWARD A SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF AUTHORITY AND RESPONSIBILITY (1989).
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signed to respond to excessively rational accounts of criminal activity,
Kahan (1997) has explored the significance of social meaning and
influence, drawing heavily from the social cognition literature. In a
broad survey of substitution effects on individuals' preferences for
engaging in criminal activity, Katyal (1997) has drawn both on the
social influence literature and the cognitive bias literature, arguing,
for example, that visibly heavy penalties for crack cocaine possession
may bolster the choice to use heroin by making it appear relatively
more attractive in context.
There has also been a good deal of attention to the social cogni-
tive influences on public attitudes towards criminality and punish-
ment. Stalans (1993), for instance, has done a laboratory study on the
use of the availability heuristic in social preferences for criminal
punishment. More generally, Beale (1997) has surveyed the psycho-
logical literature for explanations of why public preferences in this
area depart from what the empirical evidence suggests is wise.
F. Tax Law and Trusts and Estates
Tax law compliance has been a subject of particular interest to
scholars. In the legal literature, the social psychology of taxpayer
choices has been examined by a number of scholars, notably Carroll
(1987), Casey and Scholz (1991), and Kinsey et al. (1991). In a
noteworthy paper, McCaffery (1994(a)) undertook a broad exploration
of taxpayer behavior and tax policy from a cognitive perspective. He
argues that the existing normative structure of tax law (e.g., hidden
taxes, reliance on indexing) are best explained by reference to
cognitive biases, and that understanding these biases can in turn
generate strategies for channelling taxpayer behavior.
In the trusts area, Hirsch (1995) considers a host of biases in
his generally critical analysis of the soundness of contemporary legal
policy with respect to spendthrift trusts. Dobris (1997) analyzes trus-
tee behavior in preferring dividends to capital gains by reference to a
similar grouping of biases.
G. Corporate and Securities Law
Because corporations and other business associations are so
subject to market constraints, there have been long-standing doubts
as to whether psychological biases, even if robust at the individual
level, are likely to have much impact on organized economic behavior.
Nonetheless, Haft (1982) was an early proponent of the view that
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understanding various social and cognitive biases could help guide
policy formulation with respect to modes of decision making by
corporate boards of directors. Coffee (1981) took note of similar biases
in his study of corporate criminality. A few years later, Cox and
Munsinger (1985) suggested in an influential paper that predictable
in-group biases could lead to self-serving inferences regarding the
merits of derivative suits on which board special litigation committees
might be asked to pass. Hu gave some attention to the possibility of
cognitive bias both in his analysis of the relationship between time
and risk in decision making by corporate managers (1990) and in his
research on risk evaluation with respect to derivatives and other
novel financial products (1993).38 Finally, in his study of managerial
biases in organizational settings, Langevoort (1997(b)) suggests that
various forms of selective perception and self-serving inferences may
affect how senior executives perceive risks and threats, and how these
biases might skew corporate disclosures.
On the question of investor and stock market behavior, a num-
ber of finance theorists in the 1980s began asking whether predictable
cognitive biases could affect the capital markets notwithstanding
their strong efficiency properties. These inquiries led to a body of
research on "noise trading" that suggests that non-rational behavior
could cause significant deviations between market price and funda-
mental value, triggering a debate about the efficient market hypothe-
sis still ongoing in the economics literature. Langevoort examined the
implications of noise theory for securities regulation, with specific
reference to the cognitive bias problem (1992),39 and, outside of the
organized markets context, to the potential for cognitive biases to
skew decision making in the investor-stockbroker interaction (1996).
As noted earlier, Weiss (1991) used the psychological literature to ex-
press doubts as to the wisdom of the intertemporal choices of employ-
ees faced with retirement plan investment decisions, thus attacking
calls based on neoclassical economic analysis to eliminate paternalis-
tic government policies in this area.
38. Cognitive imperfection also plays a role, albeit a more limited one, in Henry T.C. Hu,
Illiteracy and Intervention: Wholesale Derivatives, Retail Mutual Funds, and the Matter of Asset
Class, 84 GEo. L.J. 2319 (1996).
39. See also the commentary of Thompson (1997). The most noteworthy uses of noise
theory in securities regulation are Janet Cooper Alexander, The Value of Bad News in Securities
Class Actions, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1421 (1994); Baruch Lev & Meiring de Villiers, Stock Price
Crashes and lOb-5 Damages: A Legal, Economic, and Policy Analysis, 47 STAN. L. REV. 7 (1994).
Here, the reliance on the behavioral literature is not explicit, but is not far from the surface. A
brief criticism of the use of this literature can be found in RONALD J. GILSON & BERNARD S.
BLACK, SOME OF THE ESSENTIALS OF FINANCE AND INVESTMENT 181-82 (1993).
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H. Property and Other Legal Entitlements
There have been a number of subjects with respect to which
legal scholars have probed the relevance of the status quo and loss
aversion biases-particularly the notion that having an existing prop-
erty interest creates a greater attachment (reflected in willingness to
sell) than would be expressed by others not in possession of the same
object (willingness to buy). This was one of Kelman's (1979) points of
departure in his early attacks on the Coase theorem, and has been
picked up by numerous others. Cohen and Knetsch (1992) argued
that this disparity can help illuminate a wide range of legal subjects,
including adverse possession, limits on the measurement of lost
profits in contract litigation, and rules governing repossession of
property. Hoffman and Spitzer (1993) have provided a detailed over-
view of this debate, expressing doubt that any strong normative claim
can be drawn absent a more refined understanding of the
phenomenon.4o In his study of whether the endowment effect should
inform the question of just compensation for the taking of property
under constitutional law, Fischel (1995) has suggested that
constitutional and public choice theory would say no.
A major work using social cognition literature to suggest that
measures of economic value are more often comparative than absolute
is McAdams (1992).41 Among other things, he examines income tax
policy and antidiscrimination law in terms of their ability to dampen
otherwise wasteful patterns of status-seeking behavior.
I. Family Law
Scott (1990) utilized cognitive biases broadly in her study of
individual decisions relating to marriage and divorce, and the appro-
priate public policy responses. More concretely, Baker and Emery
(1993) offer empirical evidence to suggest that both cognitive (e.g.,
representative) and motivational (e.g., optimistic) biases prevent
future marriage partners from seeing the risk of divorce clearly, call-
ing into question the soundness of decision making with respect to
prenuptial agreements.
40. See also Hovenkamp (1991).
41. Like McAdams, an increasing number of legal scholars have become interested in
matters of relative status in assessing economic concepts of wealth and value. The standard
reference here is to the work of behavioral economist Robert Frank, particularly ROBERT FRANI,
CHOOSING THE IGHT POND: HUMAN BEHAVIOR AND THE QUEST FOR STATUS (1985).
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J. Lawyering
Though there is little doubt-as Korobkin and Guthrie (1997)
suggest in an insightful study-that lawyers can often help debias
their clients' decision making, the possibility that cognitive biases
may affect how lawyers do their jobs has hardly gone unnoticed
either. For example, Langevoort (1993) has drawn on the cognitive
decision-making and social cognition literature to suggest that once
they commit to client representation, lawyers may be biased in the
construal of information and hence miss warning signs of client fraud.
Self-serving perceptions of fairness are the focus of Ted Eisenberg's
(1994) examination of the size of fee claims made by bankruptcy
attorneys, and overoptimism and the illusion of control are key
elements of Loftus and Wagenaar's (1988) assessment of how
litigators assess the probability of success in the cases they bring.
Kahan and Klausner (1996) have used the status quo, anchoring, and
conformity bias literature as a reason why lawyers may persist in
using outmoded contractual forms and structures. In their article,
Langevoort and Rasmussen (1997) consider the possibility that both
anchoring and adjustment and egocentric biases may be at work in
generating excessive risk aversion by business lawyers in their
counselling activities, offering an example where behavioral and
conventional economic analysis produce complimentary, not
inconsistent, accounts. From a social cognition perspective, LoPucki
(1997) has described the dissonance between the often indeterminate
"law on the books" and the often more simplified and manageable
(and highly socialized) "law in lawyers' heads."
More generally, Rhode has used the social psychology
literature on moral evolution to address the need for pervasive ethics
instruction (1992) and has also suggested that self-serving inference
may interfere with good ethical deliberation (1994). Macey (1993) has
argued that self-serving biases affect the legal profession as a whole
to taint its perceptions of the social virtue of litigation and other
lawyering activities.
Finally, Paul Brest has embarked on a mission to encourage
lawyers to become familiar with behavioral decision theory, not so
much because of the ethical questions but because creative problem-
solving by attorneys requires that heuristic forms of thinking-by
both clients and attorneys-be noticed and avoided when inappro-
priate. Brest and Krieger (1994) have examined the ways in which
problem solving can be improved within the legal curriculum; subse-
quently, Brest (1995) has tied together the problem-solving and
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professional responsibility dimensions of this learning. Blasi (1995)
has also invoked a range of cognitive psychology research in exploring
the development of expertise by practicing lawyers. Langevoort
(1997(a)), in turn, has combined the ethical and problem-solving
dimensions of professional responsibility by focusing on the need to
understand both individual and organizational cognitive biases.
K Social Risk Analysis and Policy Formulation
Underlying the analysis of many of the foregoing subject areas
has been concern about what the behavioral literature says about the
process of policy formulation generally. In their seminal article, Noll
and Krier (1990) considered the extent to which status quo/loss aver-
sion biases might influence public preferences for the regulation of
toxic and other environmental risks, and (based on more conventional
public choice theory) how regulators are likely to respond. Biases in
the demand for environmental regulation were also explored by Cross
(1994). More briefly, Rose (1994) also commented on the ability of
bias to affect environmental policy formulation, as had Latin (1982) in
an early work.42 These kinds of issues have also produced a rich
literature on the "rationality" of public risk perception, on which
Pildes and Sunstein (1995) offer a thorough analysis. A very different
kind of social risk taking-the widespread appeal of lotteries-is the
subject of analysis by McCaffery (1994(b)).
Less attention has been devoted to whether courts or regula-
tors are likely to be biased along the lines suggested in the behavioral
literature, perhaps because bureaucratic activity seems more organ-
izational than individual. This is an important line of work given the
pro-paternalism implication of the behavioral research generally,
because in the spirit of comparative institutional analysis it forces one
to assess whether paternalistic interventions will not themselves be
skewed by predictable biases. The most focused attention to this
question in the law review literature thus far is found in Gillette and
Krier (1990) and Jolls et al. (1998).43
42. An excellent collection of materials by psychologists on environmental policy is
ENVIRONMENT, ETHICS AND BEHAVIOR (Max H. Bazerman et al. eds., 1997). On criminal law
and public risk perception, see Beale (1997).
43. See also Viscusi, supra note 34; Langevoort (1997(a)) (suggesting the need for corpo-
rate lawyers to account for both managerial and regulator bias in their compliance function).
Obviously, these references invoke a long classical tradition of research in administrative
behavior, albeit largely from a sociological perspective, that emphasizes the often dysfunctional
nature of the bureaucratic mindset. See, e.g., ANTHONY DowNs, INSIDE BUREAUCRACY (1967).
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IV. FuTuRE RESEARCH
As more and more legal scholarship invokes the behavioral
research, what background questions deserve either better or more
exploration? To me, the lurking conceptual issues can usefully be
divided into four categories.
A. Descriptive Accuracy
The first kind of question is the one on which legal scholars (at
least those who are not also trained social scientists) have the least to
contribute: whether the cognitive biases are sufficiently robust em-
pirically-or sufficiently strong causally-to justify their invocation in
normative legal or policy deliberations. Although enough work has
been done to satisfy most social scientists that the bias research is
credible, legal usage must remain somewhat tentative.44
Related to this is the question of contingency. Most psycholo-
gists seem to agree that heuristics are not necessarily automatic:
there is a great deal of "task dependency" that determines how care-
fully people attend to their judgments and decisions. 45 As transaction
cost economists well understand, the question of how much time and
attention to devote to any matter is one of perceived costs and
benefits. In this sense, biases may be robust in some settings but
disappear when there is a greater level of motivation-induced by
accountability or monetary incentive, for example-toward accuracy.
This is an area where a better understanding of the forces that pro-
duce bias is likely to have some significance. Those biases that are
simply mental shortcuts should be more prone to elimination
(especially with respect to sophisticated sorts of actors). On the other
44. See McCaffery (1994(a)). For a recent counterattack, see Posner (1998). I will leave to
others the debate about whether this tentativeness justifies reversion to neoclassical economics
as a default rule for behavioral prediction other than to say that given the fairly conservative
normative implications that tend to flow from most conventional economic analysis, leaving
economics as the one social science sufficiently well-grounded to justify policy has obvious
political consequences. It is not purely speculative to suspect a strong, if not entirely conscious,
relationship between the politics (ranging from private foundation funding to the appointment
of law and economics scholars as judges) and the academic production of law and economics
analysis. This idea is touched upon in the context of securities regulation in Langevoort (1992).
45. A good articulation of this view can be found in JOHN W. PAYNE ET AL., THE ADAPTIVE
DECISION MAKER ch. 3 (1993). On the varying motivational influences determining how much
effort goes into decision accuracy, see Arie Kruglanski, The Psychology of Being 'Right".• The
Problem of Accuracy in Social Perception and Cognition, 106 PSYCHOL. BuLL. 395 (1989).
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hand, biases that serve some strong underlying motivation will be
more stubborn.6
Similar issues arise with the question of learning from experi-
ence. There is a substantial debate in the literature (of special inter-
est to economists who work with game theory) as to whether facing
repeated decision tasks will provide the kind of feedback that gradu-
ally improves the quality of the decision making. This question is
quite important, because there is great variation in the iterative na-
ture of decision making in real life settings. Members of a jury might
have little opportunity to learn from mistakes; people who bargain
over goods or services (all of us to some extent) have much more
opportunity. This insight was one basis for Romano's prediction
(1986) that the cognitive bias research would have relatively little to
say about human behavior in market settings. On the other hand, the
large experiential learning literature is not entirely optimistic,
emphasizing that feedback must be both prompt and unambiguous to
cause significant improvement.47  Here, again, the potentially
motivated nature of some biases may be significant. Social scientists
who study managerial behavior have observed the "superstitious"
nature of experiential learning given both the ambiguity and delay in
business-related feedback and the motivational needs for optimism
and control.48 Legal scholars should attend to this learning problem
carefully as they assess the extent to which legal theory or doctrine
can assume the prevalence of any given kind of bias.
46. Accountability is a good example. It is fairly well recognized that if one senses that
one will be held accountable for a decision, one will work harder to get it right. On the other
hand, accountability produces a self-serving inference when one is already committed to a
choice. See generally Philip E. Tetlock et al., Social and Cognitive Strategies for Coping With
Accountability: Conformity, Complexity and Bolstering, 57 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
632(1989).
47. In the legal literature, this point is made by Camerer (1990). From among the many
studies of learning from experience in the behavioral literature, see Berndt Brehmer, In One
Word: Not From Experience, in Arkes & Hammond eds., supra note 7, at 705. This research is
a point of departure for many laboratory studies of expert decision makers (e.g., asking experi-
enced doctors to make diagnostic judgments, or asking real estate appraisers to make valuation
decisions) that show that even experts demonstrate cognitive bias with some regularity, though
it may be a different kind of bias than that shown by other subjects. See, e.g., Margaret A.
Neale & Gregory B. Northcraft, Experts, Amateurs, and Refrigerators: Comparing Expert and
Amateur Negotiators in a Novel Task, 38 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES
305 (1986). On expert decision making in the legal literature, see Hu (1993).
48. See generally Barbara Levitt & James G. March, Organizational Learning, 14 ANN.
REV. SOC. 319 (1988); James G. March & Zur Shapira, Managerial Perspectives on Risk and
Risk Taking, 33 MGMT. SCi. 1304 (1987).
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B. Institutional Constraint
The next level of question is the profound translation problem
of moving from the assumption that cognitive biases are real to the
assumption that they are robust in the institutional settings in which
most of the economic activity that the law seeks to influence takes
place. This point has been emphasized by Rubin (1996), among
others. Markets, social norms, and organizations all constrain
individual decision making in such a way that we cannot be sure that
biases found in artificial settings will be pernicious in real life.49
This question is an empirical one, harder to study with rigor as
institutional size or complexity increases (and it moves us away from
the traditional domain of cognitive psychology and back to standard
sociology and economics). Rachlinski (1996) takes account of institu-
tional debiasing in his empirical testing directed at whether attorney
intervention in negotiations can reduce their clients' framing biases,
on the assumption that attorneys' experience and detachment incline
them more toward accurate evaluation of options; and Hu (1993) asks
whether law firms and other professionals might play a debiasing role
in the evolution of the derivatives market. But to identify institu-
tional constraint does not necessarily mean that institutions will not
themselves evidence heuristics and biases. Kahan and Klausner
(1996), for example, suggest that institutional norms such as lawyer-
designed contract terms can themselves reflect the cognitive biases of
practicing lawyers. A good bit of work exists on group behavior to
suggest that group decision making can exacerbate some kinds of
bias. This phenomenon is observed in the so-called "risky shift"
phenomenon, and in the "groupthink" construct associated with the
work of Irving Janis and his colleagues. 50 Moving toward the larger
institutional setting, there is a large volume of both theory and field
study research to support the claim that managerial perceptual bias
is a significant problem in the way organizations behave, and much of
49. This, too, was one of Romano's key points, and the essence of the orthodox economists'
challenge to the behavioral literature generally. Variations on this theme can be found in the
work of Schwartz & Wilde (1983) (markets), Heald & Heald (1991) (social norms), Croley (1996)
(organizational structure), and Kraus (1997) (commercial norms).
50. See IRVING R. JANS, VICTIMS OF GROUPTHINL A PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY OF FOREIGN
POLICY DECISIONS AND FIASCOS (1972); see also Norbert L. Kerr et al., Bias in Judgment:
Comparing Individuals and Groups, 103 PSYCHOL. REV. 687 (1996). An interesting recent study
suggests that the self-serving inference may actually be enhanced in group settings. See Chip
Heath & Forest J. Jourden, Illusions, Disillusians and the Buffering Effects of Groups, 69
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 103 (1997).
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this research is explicitly tied to the literature on heuristics and
biases.51
A particularly acute question, of course, is whether competitive
market forces are likely to erode biased decision making. The
familiar point is that suboptimal behavior can be exploited by "smart
money" arbitrage activity, dooming persistent fools to Darwinian
extinction. But as noted earlier, there is a significant body of work
that argues that even organized capital markets-the conventional
economist's paragon of rational pricing behavior-can reflect both
motivated biases and cognitive shortcuts. Hubris, loss framing, and
herd behavior are explanations being found in finance journals for the
activities of professional money managers and corporate CEOs.52 If
this is so, such biases could be expected to appear even more strongly
in the less competitive market settings that exist for the greater bulk
of economic activity. Once again, the organizational cognition
research is built on the assumption that bias does not disappear in
competitive market environments; indeed, competitive success may be
a precursor to organizational myopia and narcissism. Here, too, we
must return to the dimly illuminated questions of why biases exist in
the first place. The need for stability and routine in order to exploit a
particular technology may actually make organizational myopia an
adaptive form of cognition. 3 Similarly, institutional hubris-that is, a
firm-wide illusion of control-might lead to greater organizational
aggressiveness and cohesion and thus also be functional on average,
even if it leads to predictable but infrequent disasters. 54
51. This topic is explored in Langevoort (1997(b)). For a literature review, see James P.
Walsh, Managerial and Organizational Cognition: Notes from a Trip Down Memory Lane, 6
ORG. ScI. 280 (1995). On self-serving organizational inference, see Andrew D. Brown,
Narcissism, Identity and Legitimacy, 22 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 643 (1997).
52. See, e.g., Tilman Ehrback & Robert Waldmann, Why are Professional Forecasters
Biased? Agency Versus Behavioral Explanations, 111 Q.J. ECON. 21 (1996).
53. See, e.g., Daniel A. Levinthal & James G. March, The Myopia of Learning, 14
STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 95 (1993).
54. To simplify, if key agents believe (even excessively) in the company's future, they are
more likely to invest their human capital in it, more likely to trust others (a key to organiza-
tional success), and less likely to engage in "last period" kinds of behaviors. In this sense, an
optimistic illusion may become a self-fulfilling prophecy. See Brown, supra note 51. This is a
principal theme in some of the work of Langevoort (1995; 1997(a); 1997(b)). One should note
here the connection with sociobiology, where similar claims about the adaptive character of
egocentric cognitive illusions have been made. See, e.g., LIONEL TIGER, OPTIMISM: THE
BIOLOGY OF HOPE (1979).
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C. Legal Implications
Assuming that the foregoing matters are appropriately dealt
with, legal scholars can then proceed (gingerly) to assess how legal
doctrine or regulation should be responsive. This, of course, is what
most of the works surveyed earlier have sought to do; obviously, as
Sunstein (1997) suggests, there are many more subjects to consider.
Here, the primary challenge is to move beyond simply noting the
fallibility of human reason, and to suggest strategies that minimize
the adverse effect of misperception or misjudgment without
generating the costs associated with messy ex post interventions.
Gillette (1990) has a good overview of the dilemmas here; Viscusi
(1996) has a balanced discussion of the efficacy of information and
warnings as a mechanism for improving private decision making in a
world of bounded rationality.
One generic subject that promises to be of interest has to do
with decision making under ambiguity.55 Both heuristic and moti-
vated reasoning are particularly likely when people face ambiguity
rather than informational clarity; ambiguity, moreover, interferes
with learning from experience and thus strengthens the role of social
influences and superstitious forms of inference. 56 Long-standing
questions about the comparative virtues of specific and general legal
doctrine (rules versus standards) might well take this into account.
D. Legal Theory
In some sense, the growing prominence of the behavioral lit-
erature signals a new form of legal realism, with both primary human
action in legal settings and the legal process itself infected (or perhaps
blessed) by predictable departures from the rational ideal. A final
level of question, then, is whether there are useful ideas to be drawn
from the behavioral social science research with respect to basic ques-
tions of legal theory and legal philosophy.
Although there have been occasional references by contempo-
rary legal theorists to forms of individual cognition (e.g., cognitive
dissonance),5 7 much more work in legal theory deals with the social
constructs underlying ideas about law. That focus on social con-
55. See, e.g., Hillel J. Einhorn & Robin M. Hogarth, Decision Making Under Ambiguity, 59
J. Bus. S225 (1986).
56. See supra notes 47-48
57. See, e.g., J.M. Balkin, Understanding Legal Understanding: The Legal Subject and
the Problem of Legal Coherence, 103 YALE L.J. 105, 144-51 (1993).
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structs, however, brings us back to the blurry distinction between
individual and social knowledge and belief, and the world of social
constructionism. If individual biases are replicated, perhaps even
intensified, in social perceptions and attitudes, then understanding
them on a micro-behavioral level may help us better interpret socially
constructed forms of knowledge or ideology generally, 58 including
matters related to law. Both Sunstein (1996) and Kahan (1997) have
begun to draw connections here, for example, in their work on social
norms.59
The often-cited article by Noll and Krier (1990) on cognitive
bias in social risk perception is another good illustration of this poten-
tial. To the extent that social biases underlie a demand for some kind
of legal intervention, what is the appropriate normative response?
That risk and blame are socially constructed concepts readily decou-
pled from any form of objective rationality, as the sociologist Mary
Douglas has emphasized,60 leads to intriguing puzzles for legal theory
given the central place of risk and blame in legal reasoning. The
judgment and decision-making research may help tell us something
about social biases that affect our understanding of risk, blame, and
other building blocks of legal theory-and indeed, what we mean by
"rationality" in social discourse.61
The scholar who has grappled most deeply with rationality,
irrationality, and social theory, with occasional attention specifically
to law, is the social philosopher Jon Elster. While Elster's work on
social theory is generally well-recognized in legal scholarship (indeed,
Elster himself has contributed extensively to the legal literature), his
interest in cognitive bias and predictable departures from rationality
has received somewhat less attention in legal circles.62 One of his
58. An interesting study along these lines is Dale Griffin & Lee Ross, Subjective
Construal, Social Inference and Human Misunderstanding, in 24 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL
SOCIALPSYCHOLOGY 319 (Mark P. Zanna ed., 1991).
59. To a lesser extent, see also Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U.
CHI. L. REv. 943 (1995).
60. See MARY DOUGLAS, RISK AND BLAME: ESSAYS IN CULTURAL THEORY(1992).
61. There has been interesting literature that compares the alternative "rationality" of
public risk preferences, some of which draws from the psychological materials. See, e.g.,
KRISTIN S. SHRADER-FREcHE'ITE, PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS FOR POPULIST REFORMS (1991);
Beale (1997); Cross (1994); Pildes & Sunstein (1995). Another area where psychologists have
made a contribution is in the so-called 'just world" theory (the illusion of justice to displace the
fear that comes if the risk of random misfortune is too readily accepted). This leads, among
other things, to too easy a willingness to blame the victim for his own misfortune. See generally
KELLY G. SHAVER, THE ATTRIBUTION OF BLAME: CAUSALITY, RESPONSIBILITY AND
BLAMEWORTHINESS (1985); Feigenson et al. (1997).
62. But see Lessig, supra note 59; Sunstein (1996). For the legal audience, the most acces-
sible of Elster's books is SOLOMONIC JUDGMENTS: STUDIES IN THE LIMITATIONS OF RATIONALITY
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most pointed questions has to do with why the strong belief in ration-
ality, which he describes as a form of irrationality, so pervades legal
thought. In essence, his argument is that rationality plays a mythical
role, creating a comforting illusion of control through the rational
application of law.63 The idea of myth is, of course, a foundational
element of sociology and anthropology. What is interesting, and what
Elster sees, is that individual cognitive biases may also have their
origins in the need to make sense-to a greater degree than is justi-
fied-of a confusing, chaotic world,64 and that there is but a small step
from this need to the social demands placed on law. I suspect that
there is a good bit of legal theory that could build from the kinds of
insights Elster has drawn. For instance, is the hold that law and eco-
nomics has had on legal thinking a function not only--or not so
much--of its empirical accuracy, but rather because its central
rhetorical construct of rational man evokes an image of an
institutionally controlled (and controllable) world? Or because the
image of the rational actor as the ideal-type in the prevailing social
structure reflects the egocentric self-image of judges and lawyers? 65
V. CONCLUSION
This literature review is meant to show that the behavioral
judgment and decision research has not only a future in legal scholar-
ship, but a significant past. I suspect that its appeal thus far to legal
scholars has derived only partially from the apparent quality of the
underlying empirical research. Another part is the desire to articu-
late with something other than intuition and anecdote the skepticism
(1989) [hereinafter SOLOMONIC JUDGMENTS]. See also RATIONAL CHOICE (Jon Elster ed., 1986);
SOUR GRAPES, supra note 22; ULYSSES AND THE SIRENS, supra note 22. Recently, Elster (1997)
has contributed to the legal literature an essay on the nature and limits of motivated reasoning
and self-deception.
63. For a similar argument by a leading cognitive psychologist questioning the overuse of
psychiatric and psychological "expertise" in legal proceedings (and society generally), see ROBYN
M. DAWES, HOUSEOF CARDs: PSYCHOLOGY AND PSYCHOTHERAPY BUILT ON MYTH (1994).
64. See SOLOMONIC JUDGMENTS, supra note 62, at 57-59, 124. Along the same lines, see
Keith J. Holyoak & Richard E. Nisbett, Induction, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF HUMAN THOUGHT 50,
55 (Robert J. Sternberg & Edward E. Smith eds., 1988). From a socio-legal perspective, see
Mark C. Suchman, On Beyond Interest: Rational, Normative, and Cognitive Perspectives in the
Social Scientific Studies of Law, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 475,484.
65. In this emphasis on the possible myth-function of belief in rationality, we are not that
far from some well-known critical legal studies claims. See MARK KELMAN, AN INTRODUCTION
To CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES ch. 9 (1987) (offering a cognitive analysis of the appeal of economic
analysis in law). For a discussion of the possibility that lawyers in particular may be engaging
in egocentric inference (with an element of false consensus) in inflating the notion of
reasonableness in law, see Langevoort (1995).
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about human nature that critics of law and economics, in the tradition
of Arthur Leff,6 have long harbored.
That desire is a bit dangerous, as psychologists would amply
warn. Motivated to criticize pervasive human rationality, legal schol-
ars can easily see what they want to see in the social science materi-
als, with insufficient attention to its methodological limitations and
limited conclusions. To be honest, legal critics of rationality should
acknowledge how so much complex rational work actually seems to
get done in the personal, economic, and social settings in which law
seeks to intervene. Just as important, legal scholars who want to use
the cognitive materials persuasively need to address head-on the
question of institutional context and constraint, present in most all
the settings that pose interesting legal issues.6 7 Again, this should
not be overly daunting: The existing literature hardly justifies the
simple conclusion that institutions render individual biases trivial.
They may or may not, or they may generate entirely different forms of
bias.
In this sense, lawyerly attention to the psychology of judgment
and decision making should be coupled with comparable attention to
the literature in institutionalism generally, which has had a profound
effect in both economics and sociology. The "new institutionalist"
literature has a strong cognitive and behavioral dimension;68 cross-
references in this kind of work to Kahneman, Tversky, and their psy-
chologist colleagues are not uncommon. Indeed, one can sense from a
review of the contemporary literature of sociology, economics, and
psychology a measure of interdisciplinary convergence, raising at
least the hope for robust, tractable models of human and organiza-
66. See generally Arthur Allen Leff, Economic Analysis of Law: Some Realism About
Nominalism, 60 VA. L. REV. 451 (1974).
67. This is not to say that further study of the biases themselves is not important, espe-
cially in the form of empirical work. But concentrating on bias alone, without grappling with
institutional context, marginalizes the behavioral research in legal analysis to those settings.
that are not highly institutionalized.
68. A good example of this kind of attention is Rubin's connection of transaction cost eco-
nomics with phenomenonology in the study of lawyer involvement in the drafting of contracts in
the entertainment industry. See Edward L. Rubin, The Phenomenology of Contract: Complex
Contracting in the Entertainment Industry, 152 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 123
(1996). For a wonderful collection of materials by both economists and sociologists addressing
the question of organizational behavior, recognizing the cognitive dimension as a key to better
understanding how organizations operate, see ORGANmATION THEORY: FROM CHESTER BARNARD
TO THE PRESENT AND BEYOND (Oliver E. Williamson ed., 1990). See also THE NEW
INSTrMUTIONALISM IN ORGAMZATIONAL ANALYSIS (Walter W. Powell & Paul J. DiMaggio eds.,
1991). From a legal perspective, see Mark C. Suchman & Lauren Edelman, Legal Rational
Myths: The New Institutionalism and the Law and Society Tradition, 21 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 903
(1996).
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tional behavior that merge insights from each.69 At least the invita-
tion to integration is clear. In the long run, perhaps, legal uses of the
judgment and decision-making research may be most interesting for
their ability to inform the catholic form of law and (socio)economics
that has already begun to flourish.70
69. See Ulen (1994; 1997). The most recent editions of law and economics casebooks are
beginning to take account of the behavioral materials. See, e.g., ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS S.
ULEN, LAw AND ECONOMICS 296-97 (2d ed. 1997); see also NICHOLAS MERCURO & STEVEN G.
MEDEMA, ECONOMICS AND THE LAW: FROM POSNER TO POST-MODERNISM 181-83 (1997).
Moreover, there are aspects of the psychology research (e.g., self-serving inference) that can ac-
tually help explain why, in a world filled with apparently sincere conviction about fairness and
justice, there is so much action that instead conforms to the economist's expectation of
"selfishness with guile."
70. The growing interest of economics-oriented scholars, in law and elsewhere, in the role
of social norms on economic behavior is a good case in point. This is one of the themes, for
example, in the Wisconsin symposium, supra note 4, and in Symposium, Law, Economics and
Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1643 (1996). There seems little doubt that the literature on social
psychology can be of use in understanding norms better; as noted earlier, sociologists pay
substantial attention to the cognitive aspects of norm development and conformity. We might
well expect that norm-based literature, as well as other institutionalist literature, may take
increasing interest in the questions of cognition, inviting a blending of psychology with socio-
economics.
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